Topic: Election Security
“End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify” U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics.”
This is a recommendation Miller is making for USCYBERCOM. He’s straight up arguing for ending federal oversight of election security. USCYBERCOM plays a critical role in protecting the U.S. from cyber threats, including those targeting elections. Removing its involvement could potentially increase the risk of cyberattacks on election infrastructure. It’s almost certainly going to result in weakening election security and integrity. It’s 100% in the service of paving the way for a dictatorship.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.1: Department of Defense here.
“Of the utmost urgency is immediately ending CISA’s counter-mis/disinformation efforts. The federal government cannot be the arbiter of truth. CISA began this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign “dirty trick.””
“The government cannot be the arbiter of truth” is a telling admission. The rest of this statement is defamatory nonsense. The claim that Hillary Clinton was behind any kind of “Russia hoax” was based on unverified Russian intelligence released by Lindsey Graham and declassified by Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe. In point of fact,
“Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe on Tuesday declassified a Russian intelligence assessment that was previously rejected by Democrats and Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee as having no factual basis, according to two sources familiar with the matter.” [Source]
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.2: Department of Homeland Security and support for my above claim here.
“The department has sued multiple states regarding their efforts to enhance election integrity.”
No. Hamilton is mischaracterizing here the DOJ’s lawsuits to ensure that voting rights protections are not undermined by state laws that discriminate in the name of “security.” Two examples of this are Georgia’s SB202 and Texas’s SB1.
In 2021, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Georgia, alleging that its new election law, SB202, discriminated against Black voters and violated the Voting Rights Act. The law introduced measures such as voter ID requirements for absentee ballots and restrictions on ballot drop boxes, which opponents argued disproportionately affected minority voters.
“Kristen Clarke, assistant attorney general for civil rights at the DOJ, alleged that Georgia’s law violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits racially discriminatory voting laws – and not only has a disproportionate impact on voters of color but includes several provisions that were “adopted with the intent to deny or abridge Black citizens’ equal access to the political process.”
The DOJ also filed a lawsuit against Texas in 2021, challenging certain provisions of its voting law, SB1. The lawsuit alleged that the new rules, which limited absentee voting and empowered partisan poll watchers, violated the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by making it harder for certain groups, such as disabled individuals and non-English speakers, to vote.
Neither of the measures would have enhanced election “security”, which is why the DOJ sued.
Full contextual analysis of Section 3.8: Department of Justice here.
“Reassigning Responsibility for Prosecuting Election-Related Offenses from the Civil Rights Division to the Criminal Division.”
This would effectively make voter fraud a criminal offense rather than a civil one. More about the current penalties here36.
This is a solution begging for a problem. Voter fraud, again, is extremely rare. A comprehensive study found 31 credible instances37 between 2000 to 2014, out of more than a billion votes cast.
Full contextual analysis of Section 3.8: Department of Justice here.
“Because the FEC is an independent agency and not a division or office directly within the executive branch, the authority of the President over the actions of the FEC is extremely limited.”
I would argue that because a President was a candidate before he or she became President, the President shouldn’t have undue influence over the FEC.
Full contextual analysis of Section 5.3: Federal Election Commission here.
“Thus, by convention, a Republican President will nominate a Republican and a Democrat for two open commission slots, including the choice of the Democrat Senate leader for his party’s seat. In turn, the senator will direct his party to vote to confirm both nominees. In the almost 50-year history of the FEC, this tradition has only been broken once—when Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid refused to approve one of George W. Bush’s nominees (Hans von Spakovsky) for a Republican commission slot.”
If I were literally the only FEC commissioner in history that the Senate refused to confirm, I’m not sure I’d mention it. Impressive grudge-holding, though.
Full contextual analysis of Section 5.3: Federal Election Commission here.
“The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners.”
More arguments for staffing the federal government with regime loyalists, here.
Full contextual analysis of Section 5.3: Federal Election Commission here.
“The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree.”
So, we’re going to staff the government with loyalists, then decline to prosecute campaign finance violations. The reason this is important to point out, is that Trump is currently in violation of campaign finance laws, because he’s illegally using his campaign funding to pay his private legal bills.
The Trump campaign has also been accused in court of violating reporting requirements, contribution limits, and other requirements.
Full contextual analysis of Section 5.3: Federal Election Commission here.