Topic: The State Department
“There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies – and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision.”
So begins this section – more arguments for staffing the federal government with loyalists to the President rather than experts in their fields.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.3: Department of State here.
“As the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart–Rudman Commission) observed more than 20 years ago, the State Department is a “crippled institution” suffering from “an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.” Unfortunately, this critique remains accurate.”
You can learn more about the Hart-Rudman commission here. In a nutshell, it’s a pretty obvious pre-amble/supplement to the Project 2025 agenda (it was written in 1998.)
The basis of Skinner’s argument stems from this: The State Department has been described as having a strong institutional culture, with many career diplomats who view their mission as representing the U.S. to the world based on longstanding diplomatic norms, not just the agenda of the sitting administration.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.3: Department of State here.
“Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation.”
The president has the authority to place individuals in key roles as “acting” officials while they await Senate confirmation, in order not to leave important roles vacant for too long. These appointees can begin performing their duties immediately, even though they haven’t been confirmed by the Senate. By doing this, the president can bypass delays in the confirmation process to ensure that leadership positions in the State Department are filled with people loyal to the administration’s agenda. This puts pressure on the Senate to act, because if appointees are already in the role, the Senate may feel compelled to either confirm them or block them through a formal vote sooner, and may even be reluctant to oust someone who is already serving. Skinner is arguing that this practice should be the norm.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.3: Department of State here.
“To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presidential Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day.”
Guess who would be selecting the “Day 1” staff she describes here?
If Trump wins this time around, he’s tapped RFK, Jr. and Tulsi Gabbard to head up his transition team – an outspoken anti-vaxxer and serial abuser of animal corpses who has publicly admitted to sexually assaulting his children’s babysitters, and a woman who is a (perhaps unwitting) Russian propagandist whose campaign has taken money from Russian assets and who was literally brought up in a cult. Seriously, RFK Jr. once decapitated a whale, and doesn’t think that’s a weird story to tell people.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.3: Department of State here.
“Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration.”
She goes on to say that the next administration should review all career ambassadors “well before the first day”, and reinstate those who are loyalists to the President.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.3: Department of State here.
“Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately.”
Yet more arguments for staffing the State Department with loyalists to the President.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.3: Department of State here.
“Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be prioritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”
Yet more arguments for staffing the State Department with loyalists to the President.
Full contextual analysis of Section 2.3: Department of State here.