This is another double-authored section, where one person (Navarro) is arguing for FAIR trade policies, and the other (Lassman) is arguing for FREE trade policies. We start with Navarro.

Navarro begins by quoting Warren Buffett (CEO, Berkshire Hathaway), and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the gist of which amounts to countries aiming for trade surpluses and China’s plans for global trade dominance.

Navarro then iterates some of the challenges we face in achieving trade dominance, in his estimation:

“The first challenge is rooted in MFN: the “most favored nation” rule of the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the MFN rule, WTO members must apply the lowest tariffs that they apply to the products of any one country to the products of every other country. However, WTO members can charge higher tariffs if they apply these nonreciprocal tariffs to all countries.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 798, paragraph 3.)

This is partially inaccurate, and entirely needing clarification. The statement is correct that under the MFN rule, WTO members are generally required to apply the same tariffs (and other trade rules) to the products of all WTO members. This means that if a country grants a favorable tariff rate (the “lowest tariffs”) to one member, it must extend the same rate to all other WTO members. This principle is aimed at preventing discrimination between trading partners.

The MFN rule does allow for certain exceptions, including entering into FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) or “customs unions”, where they apply lower tariffs to members of these agreements without extending the same treatment to all other WTO members.

There are also special preferences regarding developing countries, which allows developed countries to apply lower tariffs on goods from developing countries without violating the MFN rule.

The claim that “WTO members can charge higher tariffs if they apply these nonreciprocal tariffs to all countries” is incorrect. The MFN rule does not permit charging higher tariffs across the board simply as long as they are applied to all countries. In fact, the WTO agreements limit tariff rates (known as “bound tariffs”) that countries can impose. Members can raise tariffs only if the tariffs remain within these negotiated bound rates or if they have a legitimate reason, such as invoking safeguard measures (to protect a domestic industry) or through an authorized dispute settlement process.

“The practical result has been the systematic exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers through higher tariffs institutionalized by MFN. In turn, this unfair and nonreciprocal trade has resulted in chronic U.S. trade deficits with much of the rest of the world. This systemic trade imbalance serves as a brake and bridle on both GDP growth and real wages in the American economy while encumbering the U.S. with significant foreign debt.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 798, paragraph 4.)

Ah, yes. More classic “not understanding what trade deficits are.”¹ The claim that U.S. trade deficits are a direct result of “unfair and nonreciprocal” trade practices under MFN is a misrepresentation of the causes of trade deficits.

Let’s break that down a little.

The argument that Most Favored Nation (MFN) status leads to “systematic exploitation” of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers through higher tariffs is misleading. Under MFN, tariffs are typically lowered or equalized across trading partners, preventing discrimination in trade. The U.S. has benefited from reciprocal reductions in tariffs under WTO agreements and other trade deals, which have generally expanded access to global markets for U.S. agricultural and industrial goods.

While some countries may still have tariffs on U.S. goods, the overall direction of trade policy under the MFN system has been toward tariff reduction, not higher tariffs. Moreover, MFN rules do not “institutionalize” higher tariffs—they help ensure a level playing field among WTO members.

What really happened, is that Trump introduced punishing tariffs that were in violation of WTO rules, which resulted in harm to farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers. Navarro is working really hard to shift the blame, and not very convincingly.

“The World Trade Organization ruled on Friday that U.S. tariffs imposed on steel and aluminium imports by then President Donald Trump contravened global trading rules in a judgment immediately criticised by Washington.” Source: Trump metal tariffs ruled in breach of global rules by WTO²

“Under President Donald Trump, the United States launched a series of attacks on the liberal trading system, in particular the World Trade Organization (WTO). Kristen Hopewell’s article in International Affairs explores the fallout from this ‘assault’, focusing on US efforts to undermine the appellate body – the WTO’s mechanism for enforcing its rules.” Source: Lessons from Trump’s Assault on the World Trade Organization³

“If re-elected, Donald Trump has promised a 10 per cent tariff on all goods coming into the United States — a tax on imports — and a 60 per cent tariff on Chinese goods.vThat’s not quite the shock to the system of the US Smoot-Hawley tariffs of close to 20 per cent that exacerbated and prolonged the Great Depression in the 1930s, but it’s very close. What made things worse in the 1930s was the retaliation from much of the rest of the world, ratcheting up tariffs and restrictions on global trade. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO), was created in the aftermath of the Second World War to avoid a repeat of this beggar-thy-neighbour protectionism that fed rivalry and conflict in the lead up to war.” Source: Trump, the WTO, and defending global trade⁴

Did Trump’s tariffs help American workers? I talk more about it here⁵, but the short answer is no:

“And even those jobs that have been created have come at great cost: studies suggest American consumers paid about $817,000 in higher prices attributable to the tariffs for every job created in the washing machine industry and $900,000 in the steel industry. While policy interventions to support manufacturing jobs may be warranted, there are cheaper ways to do so.” Source: Did Trump’s tariffs benefit American workers and national security?⁶

“A January 2021 study commissioned by the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) claims that former president Donald Trump’s trade policies cost the United States 245,000 jobs.” How Trump’s Tariffs Really Affected the U.S> Job Market⁷

The Tax Foundation tracks the ongoing economic impact of the Trump (and now Biden) tariffs.⁸

Navarro goes on to further misunderstand trade deficits, claiming that the U.S. is a “victim” of them. That’s not how this works:

“The great football coach Bill Parcells once said, “You are what your record says you are.” America’s record on trade – specifically American’s chronic and ever-expanding trade deficit – says that America is the globe’s biggest trade loser and a victim of unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 798, paragraph 7.)

I include this for the irony – if you are what your record says you are, then Peter Navarro’s record suggests that he is indeed a hack, a liar, a conspiracy theorist, and a convicted felon.

“In 2018, as the Trump administration was implementing such policies, Navarro argued that no country would retaliate against U.S. tariffs “for the simple reason that we are the most lucrative and biggest market in the world”. Shortly after the implementation of the tariffs, other countries did implement retaliatory tariffs against the United States, leading to trade wars.” [Source]⁹

Navarro goes on to quote Stalin, claim that COVID-19 was caused by a lab leak (which hasn’t been proven conclusively), and more. He rightly asserts that “onshoring” (as opposed to offshoring) U.S. manufacturing would reduce trade deficits, but does not present a plan for doing so.

Navarro then presents two ideas for dealing renegotiating tariffs:

“In Scenario One, if all 132 countries were to lower their higher nonreciprocal tariffs to U.S. levels, the overall U.S. trade deficit in goods would be reduced by $58.3 billion, or about 9.4% of that deficit. In contrast, in Scenario Two, if these countries were to refuse to reciprocate and the U.S. were to raise its tariffs to mirror those countries’ levels, the reduction in the U.S. trade deficit would be slightly larger: an estimate $63.6 billion, or 10.2% of the deficit. This suggests that implementing the USRTA would help to create between 350,000 and 380,000 jobs.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 803, paragraph 3.)

This statement is based on highly questionable assumptions. Scenario One assumes that the trade imbalance is largely caused by tariff differentials, where other countries impose higher tariffs on U.S. goods, thus limiting U.S. exports. Trade deficits are not, however, caused by tariff differentials:

“Figures 1 and 2 show little apparent correlation between average tariff rates or overall trade barriers and trade balances. If anything, higher tariffs are associated with lower trade balances (larger deficits). Including tariffs in regression analysis that controls for other factors yields an effect that is close to zero.” [Source]¹⁰

Daniel Griswold at the Mercatus Center writes, “If critics of the trade deficit actually succeeded in closing or eliminating it, despite the appreciating dollar, the result would be to reduce the amount of investment funds flowing into the United States. If the trade deficit were eliminated, foreign demand for US bonds and Treasury bills would fall, pushing up interest rates. Home mortgage rates would go up, making housing less affordable for working Americans. The interest rate that the federal government pays on its debt would increase, costing the federal government tens of billions of dollars more to finance its debt at a time when the government is expected to be borrowing even more for infrastructure projects. As for equity markets, reducing non-Americans’ investments in corporate stocks would lower share prices.” [Source]¹¹

More:

“The net result of Trump’s tariffs would, indeed, mean fewer imports, but also fewer exports, leaving the US with a trade deficit and lower economic output.” [Source]¹²

Scenario Two presupposes that the trade deficit is a result of higher U.S. tariffs making imports more expensive, discouraging Americans from purchasing foreign goods, thus reducing the volume of imports (and that the corresponding decline of imports would narrow the trade deficit by lowering the amount the U.S. buys from abroad.)

Again, however, this exaggerates the impact of tariffs on trade deficits. Currency exchange rates, consumer preferences, labor costs, and global supply chains have a much larger impact on trade flows. Even if tariffs were lowered globally, non-tariff barriers (like regulations or quotas) would still restrict trade. Similarly, raising U.S. tariffs could lead to retaliatory tariffs, further hurting U.S. exports.

So where are his numbers coming from?

The estimates of $58.3 billion and $63.6 billion likely come from economic models that calculate trade flows based on hypothetical changes in tariff levels. These models typically make assumptions about elasticity (how responsive trade flows are to price changes) and demand substitution (how likely consumers are to switch from foreign to domestic goods when prices rise).

Such models can be highly sensitive to assumptions, and small changes in the inputs can yield vastly different results. Therefore, without knowing the specific model used, it’s hard to verify the accuracy of these numbers.

The claim that lowering or raising tariffs would create between 350,000 and 380,000 jobs seems to rely on multipliers used in economic modeling, where increased production (due to either higher exports or fewer imports) is assumed to lead to more jobs. However, the relationship between tariffs, trade deficits, and jobs is not that direct (and we already have the proof that Trump’s tariffs not only cost jobs, but didn’t affect the trade deficit appreciably.)

In short: The numbers presented in this argument – $58.3 billion, $63.6 billion, and 350,000 to 380,000 jobs – are likely based on simplistic economic models that make unrealistic assumptions about the impact of tariffs on trade flows. While changing tariffs might have some effect on the trade deficit, the actual impact would likely be much smaller than these estimates suggest. Moreover, the U.S. trade deficit is driven by deeper structural factors like currency strength and capital flows, not just tariff levels. Therefore, the claim that adjusting tariffs could significantly reduce the deficit and create hundreds of thousands of jobs is overstated and misleading.

Navarro then advocates for economically decoupling from China, which I addressed here.¹³

Navarro then explicitly argues for:

“Strategically expand tariffs to all Chinese products and increase tariff rates to levels that will block out “Made in China” products, and execute this strategy in a manner and at a pace that will not expose the U.S. to lack of access to essential products like key pharmaceuticals.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 821, paragraph 2.)

I would love to see the logistics on that one. One possible way is graduated tariff increases on different categories of Chinese products over time. Another way is targeted exemptions for “essential” products. If they wanted to cut off China across the board (as Navarro seems to be arguing for), you’d have to first diversify your supply chains for essentials into (for example), Mexico, India, Vietnam. Navarro doesn’t detail the plan for this.

“Stop Communist China’s abuse of the so-called de minimis exemption, which allows it to evade the tariffs for products valued at less than $800.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 821, paragraph 4.)

The de minimis exemption is a U.S. customs rule that allows goods valued at less than $800 to enter the U.S. duty-free. It applies to all countries, not just China, and was raised to $800 by Congress in 2016 as part of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act. This rule is designed to reduce administrative burdens by simplifying customs processing for low-value goods, such as personal purchases made by U.S. consumers from foreign e-commerce platforms like Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba.

Chinese sellers on platforms like AliExpress and Wish take advantage of the de minimis threshold to sell low-cost goods directly to U.S. consumers without paying U.S. tariffs. This includes a wide variety of small electronics, apparel, accessories, and other consumer products. Chinese sellers benefit from this rule to ship low-value goods tariff-free. However, this practice is not unique to China, and addressing it requires careful consideration of potential unintended consequences, such as higher costs for U.S. consumers and complications with international trade rules.

“Hold the CCP accountable for the COVID-19 virus, which almost certainly originated as a genetically engineered virus from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and do so through the establishment of a presidential commission or select congressional committee that would investigate the origins of the virus; its various costs, both economically and in human life; and the possible means of collecting damages from the CCP, which are likely to rise to the trillions of dollars.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 822, paragraph 7.)

This is alarmingly conspiracy-theorist. He knows it, too, by his use of the phrase “almost certainly.” He knows this is an outrageous claim to make. While the possibility of a lab leak has not been ruled out, the theory that COVID-19 was deliberately engineered lacks substantial evidence. Many scientists and health experts argue that the most plausible explanation is still zoonotic transmission from animals to humans.

From a philosophical standpoint, acting on shaky or unproven information raises questions about responsibility—basically, we should only act on things we know for a fact to be true. Holding a government accountable without enough evidence can be seen as an overstep, and it risks spreading false accusations, which could do more harm than good. Ethically, it’s a problem to demand punishment or accountability based on uncertain claims because it could lead to injustice if those claims turn out to be wrong. Jumping to conclusions without proof undermines the core principles of rational thinking and the pursuit of truth.

The virus’s origin, whether zoonotic or the result of a lab accident, also may not necessarily implicate the entire Chinese government or CCP leadership in wrongdoing. From a justice standpoint, assigning collective guilt to an entire nation or government for what could be an accidental event might violate principles of fairness and due process. Additionally, the pandemic’s spread involved complex global factors, including delayed responses from many countries.

“When President Trump wanted to implement steel and aluminum tariffs, he had a willing servant in Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. However, Secretary of Defense James Mattis resisted. Mattis simply did not understand a key tenet of the Trump Administration: Economic security is also national security. Without vibrant steel and aluminum industries, it will be difficult for America to provide the Pentagon with the kind of weapons it needs to defend the homeland.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Peter Navarro, page 827, paragraph 4.)

Since the effects of Trump’s steel tariffs were provably detrimental, it would seem General Mattis understood things just fine.

Now, we’re on to Kent Lassman’s philosophy on Trade.

“At the same time, sound trade policy requires humility. It is not a panacea for every policy problem. Trade policy cannot favor one sector over another without causing tradeoffs that outweigh the benefits. Neither free trade nor protectionism will create jobs. Trade affects the types of jobs people have, but it has no long-run effect on the number of jobs. Labor force size is tied to population size more than anything else. The American people are smart and sophisticated enough to hear these truths.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 828, paragraph 6.)

So far, so good.

“A conservative trade policy must also take seriously the reality that in a democracy, the other side holds power about half of the time, but progressives run most agencies almost all of the time. A cardinal rule in public policy is not to give yourself powers you wouldn’t want your opponents to have.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 829, paragraph 5.)

The term “Presidential immunity” springs to mind. So far, Lassman has presented as one of the the most reasonable of the lot of Project 2025 contributors.

He goes on to describe American innovation as it has historically pertained to the agricultural sector.

“Pessimistic bias is one of the most important cultural problems that conservative policymakers need to address. In trade, as in most other areas, few people ever zoom out to see the big picture, which is one reason why so many people mistakenly believe that U.S. manufacturing and the U.S. economy are in decline.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 831, paragraph 2.)

Lassman just nailed MAGA and modern Republicans in a nutshell.

“If the United States’ economy were an athlete, right now it would be peak LeBron James. If it were a pop star, it would be peak Taylor Swift. Four years ago, the pandemic temporarily brought much of the world economy to a halt. Since then, America’s economic performance has left other countries in the dust and even broken some of its own records. The growth rate is high, the unemployment rate is at historic lows, household wealth is surging, and wages are rising faster than costs, especially for the working class. There are many ways to define a good economy. America is in tremendous shape according to just about any of them.” [Source]¹⁴

Part of the reason Americans don’t realize it is that we have very biased, anecdotal, and skewed interpretations of our feelings about the economy.¹⁵.

On to Lassman’s policy suggestions.

“Implement tariff relief to help counteract inflation by reducing prices for affected goods as well as to strengthen supply chains and boost manufacturing. End Section 232, 201, and 301 tariffs. Work with Congress to pass legislation repealing those provisions so future Presidents cannot abuse them.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 832, paragraph 5.)

Lassman is arguing for ending certain tariffs to combat inflation: Here are those specifics:

Section 232 Tariffs are imposed for national security reasons, typically on imports like steel and aluminum. The Trump administration used Section 232 to justify tariffs on these products, arguing that reliance on foreign metals weakened U.S. security. Critics argue that these tariffs drove up prices for industries that rely on steel and aluminum, such as automotive and construction sectors, contributing to inflation and hurting downstream industries.

Section 201 Tariffs are safeguard tariffs intended to protect domestic industries from serious injury caused by a surge in imports. They can temporarily limit imports to help industries adjust. The Trump administration imposed Section 201 tariffs on solar panels and washing machines, for example, to protect domestic manufacturers. Critics argue these tariffs raised costs for consumers and industries that depend on those goods.

Section 301 Tariffs are used to counteract unfair trade practices by foreign countries, like intellectual property theft or forced technology transfer. The U.S. imposed significant Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods during the U.S.-China trade war under the Trump administration. Critics say these tariffs led to retaliation from China and contributed to higher prices for U.S. consumers and manufacturers who rely on Chinese imports.

The pros of this would be lower consumer prices, supply chain improvement, and increased manufacturing output.

The cons include potential job losses or factory closures in sectors that are protected by these tariffs (assuming they would struggle to compete with cheaper imports.) This includes steel, solar, et al. Increasing imports also widens the trade deficit, assuming one is concerned about that.

“Close the Export–Import Bank, which serves mainly to subsidize foreign buyers’ purchases of goods from a handful of well-connected American manufacturers.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 832, paragraph 9.)

See the entire section about that.¹⁶

“Create a successor to the WTO (assuming that it has been fatally wounded) that is open only to liberal democracies. This would prevent authoritarian countries like China from abusing the organization for their own ends.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 833, paragraph 4.)

I think it’s hysterical how conservatives will concede that the United States is a liberal democracy when it suits the point they’re trying to make. I’m not picking on Lassman in particular, here, but it’s extremely common for conservatives to conflate the two and bray “We’Re A CoNsTiTuTiOnAl RePuBlic NoT A DeMoCrAcY” when they’re trying to make a point about democratic policy (they appear to believe that a democracy would be run by democrats and a republic would be run by Republicans, and they try to claim that since the pledge of allegiance says “to the Republic”, then that settles it.) It took me about four seconds to find this meme on Twitter:

The fact is, we’re both a Constitutional Republic – meaning that we’re governed by a Constitution – AND a Representative Democracy, meaning that the people’s representatives in the government are democratically elected. A Constitutional Republic emphasizes the rule of law and the protection of rights, often limiting majority rule to protect minorities from potential abuses. A Representative Democracy emphasizes elections and the role of the people in choosing their leaders.

What Lassman means here by “liberal democracy” is the literal definition – a form of government characterized by free and fair elections, the rule of law, the protection of individual rights, and a system of checks and balances to prevent the concentration of power. Considering the policies argued for throughout Project 2025, are we sure Lassman is one of them? Or does he just possess zero self-awareness?

“Strengthen diplomatic pressure (in concert with allies) against Beijing’s abuses. Encourage cultural and intellectual engagement with the Chinese people, remembering that blue jeans and rock ’n’ roll helped to win the Cold War.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 833, paragraph 8.)

In contrast with Navarro, who argued above that we shouldn’t negotiate with China, we should shut them out, Lassman is going for more of a “you can catch more flies with honey than vinegar” approach.

“When people try something repeatedly and it still doesn’t work, they should stop doing it – especially when the consequences turn out to be just what conservative economists have long predicted they would be. With tariffs, the proper reform is not only to get rid of the individual tariffs that have backfired, but also to build institutional safeguards against future abuse.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 833, paragraph 10.)

A quote often misattributed to Einstein (but was actually Rita Mae Brown) goes, “The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” Lassman continues:

“We are five years into the biggest experiment with tariffs since the Great Depression, and the results are in: The new tariffs raise consumer prices for ordinary Americans by about $1,200 per household every year and benefit only a small number of special interests. Steel and aluminum tariffs, enacted on national security grounds, angered allies. Beijing made not a single substantive reform in response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, pages 833 and 834.)

It kind of says it all that someone from Project 2025 would admit that Trump’s tariffs were an abject failure.

Lassman goes on to criticize trade protectionism:

“With so many eggs in so few baskets, whenever something goes wrong – which is inevitable even when nobody is at fault – families find themselves scrambling. That happened early in 2022 when contamination entered a Michigan facility that makes about 40 percent of America’s baby formula. Trade protectionism all but eliminated other options for many parents, who suddenly found empty shelves and sky-high prices for an essential item that many of them were already struggling to afford – while families in other countries were unaffected.

In response, Congress passed the Formula Act in the summer of 2022. The act eased formula tariffs and loosened never-needed labeling requirements and other import restrictions, but it was temporary. It expired at the end of 2022, leaving families still vulnerable to the cascading consequences that ensue if one thing goes wrong at only one plant.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 839, paragraphs 4 and 5.)

This part of the section is a good read – Lassman explains that the supply chain is more like a network, but thinking it’s a chain is where we go wrong. In a chain, if a link fails, the chain fails. In a networked chain, if one link fails, you can get around it. 

“For baby formula, this would mean allowing in brands that meet European Union standards even if they do not meet Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling requirements. Infants’ nutritional needs do not change across borders. If a formula is deemed healthy for European babies, then it is also healthy for American babies. The reverse is equally true.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 840, paragraph 4.)

In context, this is an argument for Mutual Recognition policies, where we can ease friction in supply networks by simply recognizing other countries’ standards for products are as valid as our own. I’m not sure that’s an okay thing to do 100% of the time, but it’s an interesting thought (it’s also a form of deregulation).

“The most persuasive arguments against a market-oriented trade policy come from another national objective: national security. Protectionism and similar progressive policies tend to weaken American security, but trade creates peace. The more countries trade, the less likely they are to fight one another and the more robust their supply networks will be. Going to war with customers is bad for business.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 842, paragraph 7.)

Well. All I can say is that it’s a shame Lassman wasn’t Trump’s economic adviser instead of Peter Navarro.

“Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement might have been the Trump Administration’s biggest trade policy mistake.” (Project 2025, Section 4.6: Trade, Kent Lassman, page 847, paragraph 3.)

Colin Grabow for the Cato Institute writes:

“Even U.S. leaders have implicitly recognized that U.S. withdrawal from the TPP placed the United States on the back foot in trade. In 2019, President Trump concluded a limited “mini-deal” with Japan to claw back some of the lost gains from TPP withdrawal. Presented as the prelude to a more comprehensive agreement (which never happened), the market access improvements realized from the agreement—mostly on agriculture and industrial goods—were still inferior to what would have been gained via the TPP.

Art of the deal, indeed. [Source]¹⁷